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When a marriage or civil partnership breaks down, the norm is for each party to take independent family law advice on their entitlement to financial provision on divorce/dissolution. Usually parties will then agree, through their lawyers, how their assets should be divided. Their lawyers will then encapsulate that agreement into a legally binding contract which is often referred to as a Separation Agreement (Agreement). This Agreement will contain a discharge clause which prevents either party from asking the court to award them any further financial provision beyond that which has been set out in the Agreement.
However, is the Agreement the end
of the story? The answer is usually, but there can be exceptions to the rule!
In terms of s.16 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, either party can ask
the court to set aside the Agreement if it was not fair or reasonable at the
time it was entered into. Although cases raised under s.16 are relatively rare,
the provision was considered recently by the Sheriff Appeal Court in the case
of Bryce v Bryce [2023] SAC (Civ) 36. The parties had separated on 7 March 2019
and, very soon after, had entered into an Agreement on 23 April 2019. The wife later
raised proceedings to set aside the Agreement as it was not fair or reasonable.
The Sheriff who first heard the case refused to do so on the basis of the five
principles set out in the leading case of Gillon v Gillon (No. 3) 1995 SLT 678,
namely :-
(a) it is necessary to examine
the agreement from the point of view of both fairness and reasonableness;
(b) the examination must relate
to all relevant circumstances leading up to and prevailing at the time the
agreement was made, including the nature and quality of any legal advice given
to either party;
(c) evidence that one party had
taken some unfair advantage of the other by reason of the prevailing
circumstances at the time of the negotiations may have a cogent bearing on the
determination of the issue;
(d) the court should not be
unduly ready to overturn agreements validly entered into; and
(e) the fact that an agreement
led to an unequal (and possibly very unequal) division of assets does not by
itself necessarily give rise to any inference of unfairness and
unreasonableness.
In Gillon the court had held that
the agreement which divided the assets unequally was fair and reasonable
nonetheless. The terms had been agreed before the significant value of the
defender’s pension was known but the pursuer still benefited substantially from
the Agreement, both parties had had separate legal representation and advice,
and, at the time the agreement had been entered into, the existence of the
defender’s pension rights was known to both parties.
The Minute of Agreement in the
Bryce case provided that the wife receive 8.5% of the value of the matrimonial
property and the husband 91.5%. The Sheriff found that although these figures
suggested an unfair and unreasonable agreement at first glance, when he
considered the surrounding circumstances in terms of Gillon, he found the
Agreement should stand. These circumstances included the disclaimer that the
wife had signed confirming that she had been given the opportunity to take
independent legal advice but had declined to do so, that she did not have poor
mental health or any intellectual impairment, that the husband’s solicitor had acted
only for the husband and the wife was informed that she could obtain
independent legal advice. The Sheriff found that it was the wife’s choice to
enter into the Minute of Agreement and that the imbalance created by the Agreement
resulted from her own failure to protect her position.
However, the Appeal Court found
that the Sheriff had wrongly applied the Gillon principles. The agreement was
not fair because of the enormous imbalance in the division of property which
was not counterbalanced by any significant benefit to the wife. Further, it was
not reasonable as it did not take any account of the value of the former
matrimonial home nor of the value of the husband’s pension as these had not
been valued at the time of signing and the wife did not appear to know about
her entitlement to share in her husband’s pension. Finally, it was neither fair
nor reasonable as it was signed when the wife had not received legal advice and
she was under the mistaken impression that the husband’s solicitor may have
been acting for both parties. Accordingly, they ordered that the agreement
should be set aside.
Clients will often think that it is easier and cheaper if their estranged spouse/civil partner has no solicitor and sometimes, they also think that this means that they will be able to retain more than a fair share of the matrimonial property. The Bryce case demonstrates, however, that this approach could go horribly wrong. The husband in the Bryce case was found liable for the wife’s appeal procedure expenses which he will have to pay on top of the initial expense of negotiating the fated Agreement and his own legal expenses in the ensuing litigation. He will also then require to pay further legal costs in relation to re-negotiating the terms of a fresh Separation Agreement based on a fair sharing of the assets, or indeed of a divorce litigation if terms cannot be agreed – this is no doubt a matter of deep regret and is a cautionary tale to all family lawyers who are negotiating with an unrepresented party.
For advice and assistance in relation to separation and divorce, and all other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2403 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk.

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.
N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.