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Children Cohabitation Divorce International Family Law

Can I rely on a Separation Agreement?

Can I rely on my Separation Agreement?

When a marriage or civil partnership breaks down, the norm is for each party to take independent family law advice on their entitlement to financial provision on divorce/dissolution. Usually parties will then agree, through their lawyers, how their assets should be divided. Their lawyers will then encapsulate that agreement into a legally binding contract which is often referred to as a Separation Agreement (Agreement). This Agreement will contain a discharge clause which prevents either party from asking the court to award them any further financial provision beyond that which has been set out in the Agreement.

However, is the Agreement the end of the story? The answer is usually, but there can be exceptions to the rule! In terms of s.16 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, either party can ask the court to set aside the Agreement if it was not fair or reasonable at the time it was entered into. Although cases raised under s.16 are relatively rare, the provision was considered recently by the Sheriff Appeal Court in the case of Bryce v Bryce [2023] SAC (Civ) 36. The parties had separated on 7 March 2019 and, very soon after, had entered into an Agreement on 23 April 2019. The wife later raised proceedings to set aside the Agreement as it was not fair or reasonable. The Sheriff who first heard the case refused to do so on the basis of the five principles set out in the leading case of Gillon v Gillon (No. 3) 1995 SLT 678, namely :-

(a) it is necessary to examine the agreement from the point of view of both fairness and reasonableness;

(b) the examination must relate to all relevant circumstances leading up to and prevailing at the time the agreement was made, including the nature and quality of any legal advice given to either party;

(c) evidence that one party had taken some unfair advantage of the other by reason of the prevailing circumstances at the time of the negotiations may have a cogent bearing on the determination of the issue;

(d) the court should not be unduly ready to overturn agreements validly entered into; and

(e) the fact that an agreement led to an unequal (and possibly very unequal) division of assets does not by itself necessarily give rise to any inference of unfairness and unreasonableness.

In Gillon the court had held that the agreement which divided the assets unequally was fair and reasonable nonetheless. The terms had been agreed before the significant value of the defender’s pension was known but the pursuer still benefited substantially from the Agreement, both parties had had separate legal representation and advice, and, at the time the agreement had been entered into, the existence of the defender’s pension rights was known to both parties.

The Minute of Agreement in the Bryce case provided that the wife receive 8.5% of the value of the matrimonial property and the husband 91.5%. The Sheriff found that although these figures suggested an unfair and unreasonable agreement at first glance, when he considered the surrounding circumstances in terms of Gillon, he found the Agreement should stand. These circumstances included the disclaimer that the wife had signed confirming that she had been given the opportunity to take independent legal advice but had declined to do so, that she did not have poor mental health or any intellectual impairment, that the husband’s solicitor had acted only for the husband and the wife was informed that she could obtain independent legal advice. The Sheriff found that it was the wife’s choice to enter into the Minute of Agreement and that the imbalance created by the Agreement resulted from her own failure to protect her position. 

However, the Appeal Court found that the Sheriff had wrongly applied the Gillon principles. The agreement was not fair because of the enormous imbalance in the division of property which was not counterbalanced by any significant benefit to the wife. Further, it was not reasonable as it did not take any account of the value of the former matrimonial home nor of the value of the husband’s pension as these had not been valued at the time of signing and the wife did not appear to know about her entitlement to share in her husband’s pension. Finally, it was neither fair nor reasonable as it was signed when the wife had not received legal advice and she was under the mistaken impression that the husband’s solicitor may have been acting for both parties. Accordingly, they ordered that the agreement should be set aside.

Clients will often think that it is easier and cheaper if their estranged spouse/civil partner has no solicitor and sometimes, they also think that this means that they will be able to retain more than a fair share of the matrimonial property. The Bryce case demonstrates, however, that this approach could go horribly wrong. The husband in the Bryce case was found liable for the wife’s appeal procedure expenses which he will have to pay on top of the initial expense of negotiating the fated Agreement and his own legal expenses in the ensuing litigation. He will also then require to pay further legal costs in relation to re-negotiating the terms of a fresh Separation Agreement based on a fair sharing of the assets, or indeed of a divorce litigation if terms cannot be agreed – this is no doubt a matter of deep regret and is a cautionary tale to all family lawyers who are negotiating with an unrepresented party.

For advice and assistance in relation to separation and divorce, and all other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2403 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk. 

The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third party website to which this webpage refers.

 

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Children Divorce International Family Law

What is the likelihood of me being able to get my ex-partner’s parental rights and responsibilities removed

wHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OR ME BEING ABLE TO GET MY EX-PARTNERS' PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES REMOVED?

The answer to this question is likely to be “not high” though it will, of course, depend on the circumstances of your case. An order depriving a parent of their responsibilities and rights was described by Sheriff Reid in the recent case of AB v CD [2024] SC KDY 2 as “a (or perhaps the) most profound interference with a party’s rights under Art.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights”. Accordingly, the Court must be satisfied that the order sought is proportionate and there is no less draconian, but equally effective way, of securing the best interests of the child.

The parties in AB v CD were the parents of an 11-year-old child – “Andrew”. Following the parties’ separation in 2017, Andrew lived with his mother and had contact with his father. In 2018 the court made an order reducing that contact to nil following allegations that the father had assaulted and sexually assaulted the mother and her three older children (not the father’s children). He was ultimately convicted of these offences and imprisoned. The pursuer sought to remove the father’s parental rights and responsibilities (PRR) under s.11(2)(a) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 on the basis that the continuation of these rights caused her stress and anxiety and that Andrew had no relationship with his father and would not miss it.

As with any application for an order under s.11 of the 1995 Act, the Sheriff considered the case on the basis that Andrew’s best interests were his paramount consideration. In his judgment, his Lordship found that it was not better for Andrew that the father’s parental responsibilities and rights were removed and refused the order. The principal factors that were relevant to the Sheriff’s decision were as follows :-

1.  The continuation of the father’s PRR did not pose a direct threat to Andrew

2. The mother’s desire for a clean break from the father carried little weight

3. There was no evidence that the mother’s stress and anxiety about the continuation of the father’s PRR was such that she had a diagnosable psychological or psychiatric condition

4. There was no evidence of a wider effect upon the pursuer’s family.

5. There was no evidence of an adverse effect on Andrew

6. That the order were made, Andrew would be legally orphaned

As a fall-back position the mother had asked the Sheriff to suspend the father’s PRR. Sheriff Reid refused to suspend the right of residence as doing so would make no difference as the mother already had a residence order. Similarly, he refused to suspend the father’s right and responsibility to maintain personal relations with Andrew given the terms of the existing contact order.

Sheriff Reid did agree, however, to suspend the father’s right and responsibility to act as Andrew’s legal representative along with the father’s responsibility to safeguard and promote Andrew’s health, development and welfare. He also suspended the father’s right to control, direct or guide Andrew. The corresponding responsibility was not suspended as it was effectively already limited by the contact order.

Finally, he ordered that, given the defender would have no direct role in Andrew’s life, that the pursuer should be entitled to remove Andrew from the United Kingdom without the defender’s consent.

For Sheriff Reid the orders struck the appropriate balance between protecting the child, giving the mother the certainty and security, she needed but, did not close the door entirely on the possibility of the defender and Andrew re-establishing a relationship in the future. This may be a surprising outcome to some readers and also acts as a reminder that robust evidence, medical evidence in particular, will be needed if the parent seeking to deprive the other parent of their PRR is claiming that the impact on them will have an indirect adverse impact on the child. 

For advice and assistance in relation to parental rights and responsibilities, and all other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2403 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk. 

The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third party website to which this webpage refers.

 

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Divorce International Family Law

How will our assets be divided on Divorce/Dissolution?

How will our assets be divided on Divorce/Dissolution?

When married or civil partnered individuals separate, the law which applies to the division of their assets is found in the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. In terms of that Act, the parties’ matrimonial /partnership property should be shared fairly. “Fairly” can often mean equally but there is provision in the Act for unequal sharing in certain circumstances.  However, such unequal sharing is entirely at the discretion of the Judge or Sheriff who is dealing with the case. Often, they will find that the respective parties’ arguments for unequal sharing negate each other and will simply order equal sharing of the assets.

 

In fact, this is exactly what happened in the recent case at Aberdeen Sheriff Court, LM v AM [2023] SC ABE 34. Here there were three unequal sharing arguments which all failed and the Sheriff found that the net assets should be shared equally. Firstly, the husband argued that the value of the matrimonial home should be shared unequally due to pre-marriage funds that he had injected into the purchase of an earlier property which the parties had bought. However, the Sheriff accepted the wife’s evidence that she had provided a largely equal sum. Accordingly, taking a broad-brush approach, the Sheriff held that the matrimonial home should be sold and the net free proceeds shared equally.

It is possible to seek unequal sharing where one party will bear more than half of the costs associated with caring for a child of the parties who is under 16. The wife made this argument but provided no evidence of those costs or the accommodation that she would require to acquire for her and her son to live in. On the basis of her earnings, the Sheriff was satisfied that an equal sharing of the assets would be sufficient for her to secure suitable accommodation in any event and found no basis on which to order unequal sharing.

The third argument related to the parties’ heritable properties. The wife argued that she had been economically disadvantaged as the parties’ jointly owned flat had been rented out and the husband had retained all of the rent. The husband claimed he had been disadvantaged as he had paid the outgoings on the property to which the wife had made no contribution. The Sheriff found that the husband had paid significantly more than the wife in relation to the combined mortgage payments on the flat and the matrimonial home whilst the wife had had exclusive occupation of the matrimonial home since separation. On that basis and employing his “broad axe”, he accordingly found that there should be equal sharing in relation to the flat.  

The Sheriff commented at various points that the evidence was either non-existent, vague, or unsatisfactory. This case is therefore very much a cautionary reminder to anyone contemplating a litigation where they are arguing for more than a one-half share of the assets. Due to the breadth of the Sheriff’s discretion in this regard, this is very risky, particularly where you do not have robust evidence to support your case. If a party takes a case all the way to a final hearing and is unsuccessful, there is also the significant risk that they will be found liable for the other party’s judicial expenses as well as having to meet all of the costs related to their own case. The cost implications for parties are, accordingly, considerable, not to mention the polarising effect that the litigation will likely have on them. This is particularly undesirable for parties with children whom they may be co-parenting for some time to come.

Court should always be the last resort. there are many other ways to navigate the financial aspects of a separation, for example; mediation, negotiation, collaborative law, or arbitration. It is also always important to consult a family law specialist prior to getting married or entering a Civil Partnership to discuss the drafting of a Pre-Nuptial Agreement. This can significantly limit the scope for unequal sharing arguments, and the associated expense and update, in the event of a future separation. 

For advice and assistance in relation to separation and divorce, and all other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2403 or email us at receptin@flmscotland.co.uk. 

The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third party website to which this webpage refers.

 

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Children Divorce International Family Law

Relocation of Children: M v A [2023] CSOH 80

Relocation of Children : M v A 2023 [CSOH] 80

In my last blog about relocation, I looked at the case of W v W [2023] CSOH 72 in which Lord Stuart refused a mother’s application for her son to relocate from Scotland to France. In M v A [2023] CSOH 80 Lord Stuart was faced with another relocation application, this time within Scotland, and in quite unusual circumstances. However, unusual as it was, the test that Lord Stuart had to apply when considering the application was still the usual welfare test and whether the relocation would be in the best interests of the children or not.   

In M v A, the mother was the primary carer of the children aged 2 and 4. Before January 2023, the father, who was making the application for the children to relocate, had exercised intermittent contact with the children who had lived in Aberdeen with their mother since September 2022. From January 2023 the father began exercising alternate weekend contact with them in Glasgow. However, unlike in most relocation cases, he was not also seeking a residence order and agreed that the mother should continue to be the primary carer. Therefore, unusually, in practical terms, he was not only seeking relocation of the children but of their mother too.

Lord Stuart refused the application on the basis that the children were well settled in Aberdeen and based this decision on a number of factors. He considered that they lived in appropriate accommodation. Further, their mother was is in good employment in Aberdeen, with prospects of promotion and was therefore in a secure position to provide for the children. In terms of education, he found that the children attended a reputable nursery in Aberdeen where they were doing well and from which they would progress along with their peers in the usual way. He also found that no better health provision existed in Glasgow compared to Aberdeen.

The children’s mother was a Latvian national and in Aberdeen she and the children were part of a community of adults and children who supported both their Scottish and Latvian heritages. This was an important factor in favour of staying in Aberdeen as this could not be replicated in Glasgow. Further, the children’s paternal grandparents lived in St Andrews which was equidistant between Glasgow and Aberdeen and so were able to be a meaningful part of the children’s lives whether they were in Aberdeen or Glasgow.

Whilst Lord Stuart accepted that the distance between the children and the father did have a negative impact on the children’s ability to have direct contact with him, the father had said in evidence that he would consider moving to Aberdeen if he was unsuccessful in the application. Further, the father’s employment was temporary and his home was not his own but rather was owned by a family trust. This was in direct contrast to the mother’s home and employment situation which provided a solid and stable environment for the children.

Accordingly, Lord Stuart saw little, if any, benefit in requiring the children to relocate to Glasgow and was of the view that their circumstances could be improved by the pursuer taking action rather than the children. Throughout the evidence Lord Stuart considered that the father’s application appeared to be based on what he wanted as opposed to what was objectively in his children’s best interests.

This case reminds us that if children are thriving in the status quo, then an application to relocate them elsewhere is very likely to be unsuccessful. It is important that clients are aware of the hurdles they will face if they wish to raise an action for relocation given the significant cost implications of doing so, not to mention the potential destruction of any remaining relationship with the other parent and the ramifications of that for continued co-parenting. 

For advice and assistance in relation to child relocation, and all other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2403 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk. 

The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third party website to which this webpage refers.

 

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Children Divorce International Family Law

Relocation of Children

Relocation of Children

When faced with a parent’s request to allow their child to relocate out with the UK, it is settled law in Scotland that the court’s decision is based solely on the best interests of the child irrespective of how much time the child spends with each parent. In England, the leading case of Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166, on the other hand, confirmed that, whilst the child’s best interests were paramount, great weight had to be accorded to the reasonable plans of a parent with a residence order. Having said that, although this decision has not yet been overturned by the Supreme Court or by the enactment of new legislation, the English courts can now be seen to be moving more towards the Scottish “presumption free” approach.

Relocation was the main focus of the recent case of W v W [2023] CSOH 72 where the father opposed the mother’s request for their 3-year-old son to relocate to France. The father had been born and raised in Scotland. His wider family all lived close by. The mother had been born in France but had moved to Scotland where she had lived since 2011. The mother’s extended family lived in France. The parties had separated in December 2021. By June 2022 the parties had equal care of their son and, at that point, the father agreed to allow relocation to France in the summer of 2023. In May 2023 he withdrew his consent.

The parties were agreed that each parent gave an excellent standard of care to the child and that he had devoted families in Scotland and France. They also agreed that he was happy at nursery and that he was thriving, happy and well adjusted.

Lord Stuart presided over the case and confirmed the test for relocation cases, namely that the child’s welfare was paramount and that the court had to weigh up all relevant factors in the case before making a decision. The Scottish approach is entirely “presumption free” and no particular factor has greater weight than any other. Everything depends on the child involved and their unique circumstances.

Lord Stuart confirmed that it was for the mother to show that (1) relocation would be in the best interests of the child and (2) that from the child’s perspective, it would be better to allow relocation than to make no order. It was of no consequence that the father had previously agreed to the relocation.

When assessing the evidence, Lord Stuart based his decision on five main areas :- 1) relationship with parents, including maintenance of contact, 2) wider family relationships and childcare, including family support, 3) employment, 4) accommodation, and 5) education.

Lord Stuart found the position to be largely neutral in relation to the areas of employment, accommodation, and education. However, the evidence in relation to the first and second areas shaped his decision. He found if the child relocated, it would fundamentally undermine both the important and beneficial presence of the father in the child’s life and the child’s desire for physical contact with him. The holiday contact and indirect contact proposed by the mother was a poor substitute and not in the child’s best interests. For his Lordship, the reduction of the child’s relationship with his father and the role his father played in his life would be the most significant disadvantage to the child. He also found that relocation would significantly reduce the benefits that the child derived from his interactions with the father’s extended family.

This case is a reminder that pursuing an order for relocation will be an extremely challenging task where there is a close relationship with the other parent. As Lord Stuart said in W v W, in that situation, there would have to be clear evidence of significant benefits to the child in other areas before the court could conclude that the negative effect on the relationship between the left behind parent and the child was sufficiently offset to demonstrate that relocation was in the child’s best interests. Examples may be where the child has particular medical or educational needs that would be best served in the other country.

For advice and assistance in relation to child relocation, and all other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2403 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk. 

The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third party website to which this webpage refers.

 

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Cohabitation International Family Law

Cohabitation – I have missed the one-year deadline – what do I do?

Cohabitation - I have missed the one year deadline to make a claim- what do I do?

Since the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 came into force, former cohabitants in Scotland have been able to make a claim against each other following separation. Cohabitants are specifically defined as “a man and a woman who are (or were) living together as if they were husband and wife or two persons of the same sex who are (or were) living together as if they were civil partners”.

What can they claim?

Cohabitants can claim a capital sum to redress any economic disadvantage suffered as a result of the contributions they have made to the relationship, and which disadvantage has not been balanced out by any advantage they have gained from the other party’s contributions. “Advantage” includes gains in income, capital and earning capacity and disadvantage is construed accordingly. “Contributions” include both direct contributions such as payments of money and indirect contributions such as restricting one’s career and looking after any children of the relationship. A separate claim can also be made to ensure that the economic burden of raising any children of the relationship is shared.

Time limit

Although the 2006 Act is due to be reformed, currently cohabitants only have one year from the date they separated to make their claim. If that time limit passes with no action being raised, then the court is unable to accept a late claim.

What next?

The time limit can create a very unfair situation. For example, cohabitant, “A” may have sold their house and contributed the proceeds of sale to the purchase of a new home with cohabitant “B” because they thought they were going to get married and that, therefore, in the longer term they would share in the value of the property. However, the title to the property is taken in the name of B alone. If the parties separate and it has been over a year since separation, A cannot raise an action against B under the 2006 Act. However, all is not necessarily lost. A may have the option to make a claim against B under the common law of unjust enrichment. The likelihood of success will be largely dependent on the quality of evidence available – something which saw the downfall of the pursuer in the recent case of Richard Gourlay v Lorna Clark at Dundee Sheriff Court. The pursuer had no evidence to support his claim and was found to be an entirely incredible and unreliable witness. Unjust enrichment is, however, a very complicated area of the law and one upon which expert advice from a specialist family lawyer is required.

How can I minimise difficulties that may occur on the breakdown of my cohabiting relationship?

One of the most common issues that arises when cohabitants separate is that one party has been paying the mortgage on a property which is in the other party’s sole name. On separation, the party who has been so contributing may request a capital sum based on the proportional increase in property value. The other party may argue that they were simply paying rent and that they have been advantaged by the relationship in other ways, negating any disadvantage. The associated legal costs to analyse all the contributions made by each party over the relationship is significant. Such costs can be minimised by the parties entering into a Cohabitation Agreement which can set out, for example, in what shares the mortgage and bills are paid and what, if any, sum will be paid to one of the parties in the event of separation and exactly how that will be calculated.

 

Another common use of the Cohabitation Agreement is where parties are making unequal contributions to the purchase of a property which is being taken in joint names. The agreement can set out what those contributions are and how the value of the property should be divided in the event of separation. This type of agreement is ideal for the situation where parents gift money to their children to purchase property and they wish to ensure that the gift is protected in the event of separation.

 

A Cohabitation Agreement can therefore provide certainty as to how certain aspects of any separation will be regulated, alleviating some of the stress and pain that accompanies that separation and minimising any legal fees. 

 

For advice on cohabitation, unjustified enrichment and other family matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2430 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk.

 The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third party website to which this webpage refers.

 

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Children International Family Law

I have separated from my partner – who is going to pay the children’s school fees?

I have separated from my partner - who is going to pay the children's school fees?

When a couple separates and parties require to adapt to becoming two households, one matter that may have to be resolved quickly is how any school fees are going to be paid. If there is a dispute about this that cannot be resolved via mediation or negotiation, then it is either the court, (or potentially an arbitrator), who will ultimately need to make a decision on who is paying what.

In terms of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, a parent can ask the court to make an order that the other parent pay all or part of their child’s school fees.  They can also ask the court to backdate any award that is made. In determining the amount to award, the court shall have regard to the needs and resources of both parties to the action and of the child (and indeed anyone else who has a duty to aliment (financially support) the child), their earning capacities, and generally to all the circumstances of the case. When looking at the child’s “needs”, it is the need of the individual child that is relevant.

The court may also take into account whether the defender (the person being asked to pay) provides support, financial or otherwise, to any other person whom they maintain as a dependent in their household, whether or not the defender owes an obligation of aliment to that person. It shall not take account of any conduct of a party unless it would be manifestly inequitable to leave it out of account. 

When the court looks at the parties’ resources, this means both present and foreseeable resources.  Indeed, in the recent case of X v Z [2023] CSOH 48, Lady Carmichael commented that in her view both parties would be able to work but neither were doing so. Accordingly given the general principle that disruption of a child’s education should be avoided, if possible, she found that if the children were to remain at their current schools, the school fees would need to be paid from the parties’ capital resources. She therefore ordered that the defender pay a sixth of the fees due. In practical terms this meant the mother would require to cover the remaining 5/6th of the fees from her capital resources which were of significant value.

If school fees are an issue in your separation, it is important to take early advice from a specialist family lawyer. The ideal outcome will be a negotiated agreement with the other parent. If agreement cannot be reached, the matter will require to be determined by the court (or potentially by an arbitrator). This will involve an in-depth analysis of each party’s finances which incurs significant cost, not to mention the likelihood of souring further the relationship between the parties. This is in no-one’s interests, particularly those of the children involved.

For advice on separation and children and other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2430 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk.

The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third-party website to which this webpage refers.

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Divorce International Family Law

Pre-Nups and Post-Nups

Pre-Nups and Post-Nups

These days, the matter of entering a Pre-Nuptial agreement is not as unusual as it once was. Couples recognise that these Agreements are not just for the rich and famous and that they are becoming part of wedding planning, albeit a somewhat non-romantic aspect!

The age at which individuals are now marrying/entering a Civil Partnership, has been steadily increasing over the last sixty years or so. Therefore, many will already own a home and other assets that they have put blood, sweat and tears into accumulating. A Pre-Nuptial/Civil Partnership Agreement can protect these assets in the event of a future separation so that they are classed as “Separate Property” and do not form part of the matrimonial/civil partnership property available for division between the spouses/civil partners. Alternatively, a Pre-Nup can be more far-reaching and can be used to agree exactly what financial provision will be made in the event of a future separation.

One of the huge benefits of a Pre-Nup, is the ability to agree on the division of assets that are purchased during the marriage/civil partnership but which are funded by the “Separate Property”. As the assets are purchased after the date of the marriage/civil partnership, they are classed as matrimonial/civil partnership property. On separation the court is not obliged to divide the assets unequally.  Whilst the court can take the contributions from the Separate Property into account, this is entirely at their discretion. The range of outcomes can therefore be wide indeed. Accordingly, reaching agreement on these matters in advance can avoid significant legal expense, not to mention stressful litigation.

Post-Nuptial/Civil Partnership Agreements are less well known but are often used instead of a Pre-Nuptial Agreement. It may be that the couple has only considered entering an Agreement very close to their wedding/civil partnership date. In that event we do not advise that couples rush to sign a Pre-Nup before the wedding/civil partnership date. Each party has to have sufficient time to consider the implications of the Agreement and should not feel under pressure to sign. If an Agreement is rushed through there is a risk that in the event of a future separation, one party can successfully challenge the Agreement on the basis it was not fair and reasonable when it was entered into. Accordingly, rather than rush through a Pre-Nup, we always advise parties to take their time and agree the terms of a Post-Nuptial Agreement as soon as possible after the date of the wedding/civil partnership. 

Another use for Post-Nuptial Agreements is where one party to the marriage/civil partnership has received an inheritance or gift during the marriage/civil partnership and wishes to use that money to enhance a matrimonial/civil partnership asset or reduce matrimonial/civil partnership debt. The Post-Nup can set out how this should impact the division of the enhanced asset in the event of separation. Alternatively, a party’s business, which is not a matrimonial/civil partnership asset, may be restructuring and issuing new shares. As these shares are being acquired during the marriage/civil partnership, they are matrimonial/civil partnership assets even though the original shares were not.  Again, the Post-Nup can be used to protect these new shares in the event of separation.

There is an urban myth that Pre-Nups (and by extension Post-Nups) are not enforceable in Scotland. However, this is not the case and the guiding principle is, in fact, that the court should not disturb an Agreement which has been validly entered into. For there to be a successful challenge, the challenging party has to prove that the agreement was not fair or reasonable at the time it was entered into. Even if the Agreement leads to a very unequal division of the matrimonial/civil partnership assets, this does not automatically mean that the court will find that the Agreement was unfair or unreasonable. Indeed, where parties have received good quality legal advice it is likely to be very difficult for a challenge to be successful.

For advice on separation and divorce and other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2430 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk.

 

The content of this webpage is for information only and is not intended to be construed as legal advice and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice. Family Law Matters Scotland LLP accepts no responsibility for the content of any third-party website to which this webpage refers.

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Children Cohabitation Divorce International Family Law

1980 Hague Convention and Grave Risk

1980 Hague Convention and Grave Risk

In my last blog, I noted that successfully defending a Petition for the return of a child to their country of origin under Article 13(1)(b) of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is very much the exception and not the rule. This is known as the “grave risk” exception and gives the court discretion not to return a child where there is a grave risk that their return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.

However, we now have a recent Scottish case where the defence succeeded. In March, the Inner House of the Court of Session (the Appeal Court) issued their judgment in the case of AD v SD [2023] CSIH 17. Here the mother of two children, who were habitually resident in Illinois, USA, had wrongfully retained them in Scotland. The mother lodged evidence of psychological, physical, and sexual abuse that she had been subjected to by AD and submitted that a return to the USA would put the children at grave risk. The defence failed initially, and the Judge ordered return.   

However, the mother appealed to the Inner House who overturned the Judge’s decision. They referred to the test set out in the UK Supreme Court case of E [2012] 1 AC 144 which states that where the “grave risk” defence founding on domestic abuse is pled, a staged approach is required. Firstly, the court needs to ask, if the disputed allegations are true, would there be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation? If it concludes that there would be such a grave risk, the court must then ask if the child can be effectively protected against the risk. Further, the court needs to consider whether the protective measures require to cover more than the immediate future because the need for effective protection may persist. This was not the approach taken by the Judge at first instance who only considered whether the protective measures in place would be sufficient in the short term.

In AD v SD the Inner House found, on the basis of extensive evidence presented to the first instance Judge, that SD had established a grave risk that harm to her of the most severe kind (physical injury or worse) would occur in the event that she and the children were returned to Illinois. That would place the children in an intolerable situation, as would repetition of the unrelenting harassment and intimidation that SD had been subjected to by AD.

The Inner House then had to assess whether the proposed protective measures would effectively protect the children from that risk, namely various legal remedies available to SD in the Illinois courts. They found that it would be unlikely that AD would comply with any orders made by the Illinois courts given his persistent breaches of an order already made in his own jurisdiction’s proceedings, coupled with his reluctance to agree to protective orders on the children’s return. On that basis they stated that it would be inconceivable that a return would be ordered.  

This case was, of course, very fact specific and sadly involved significant abuse but it acts as a reminder that the defence is available to use for the protection of children in Hague cases where appropriate.

For advice on international parental child abduction or any other family law matters, please contact us on 0141 420 2430 or email us at reception@flmscotland.co.uk.

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.

Categories
Children International Family Law

Can a child currently be returned to Ukraine under 1980 Hague Convention? Part 2

Can a child currently be returned to Ukraine under the 1980 Hague Convention? PART 2

It has long been recognised that successfully defending a Petition for the return of a child to their country of origin under Article 13(1)(b) of the Hague Convention will very much be the exception and not the rule. This is known as the “grave risk” exception and gives the court discretion not to return a child where there is a grave risk that their return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The Convention is based on mutual respect between signatory countries and the confidence that they have in their respective legal systems to protect individuals who live there. My colleague, Marisa Cullen, recently discussed the recent English case of Q v. R [2022] EWHC 2961 (Fam) where this was exactly the basis of the respondent parent’s Article 13(b) defence (https://www.familylawmattersscotland.co.uk/2022/12/12/can-a-child-currently-be-returned-to-ukraine-under-1980-hague-convention/ ). The child had been wrongfully removed from Ukraine. On the face of it, this was exactly the type of case where we would expect the Article 13(b) defence to succeed.  However, the Judge stayed true to the Convention and ordered return.

However, on 17 March 2023, Dexter Dias, KC (sitting as High Court Judge) of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice issued his decision in the case of [2023] EWHC 602 (Fam), in which he allowed an applicant father to withdraw his Petition for the return of his two children to Kyiv, Ukraine. During the course of the father’s application, things had evolved for the worse in Kyiv. The court therefore had to assess if it was in the interests of justice to allow him to withdraw the application and, as such, the Judge delivered a judgement on the mother’s Article 13(b) defence only. The Judge found that given the regular missile strikes in Kyiv, which were targeting civilian buildings and infrastructure that there was an unquestionable risk of physical harm to the children.

Following the finding that there was risk of harm, Dias, KC went on to consider whether the risk could be “ameliorated” or sufficiently mitigated to enable the children to return to Kyiv safely. The Judge found that it could not. Nothing could be done to influence the military strategy of Vladimir Putin or the Russian state. The court concluded that Kyiv was an ongoing target and the applicant was permitted to withdraw his application.

This was an eminently sensible decision based on the facts of the case though a terrible situation for the family. The Judge made clear, however, that this the Judgment in no way reflected a blanket policy to the situation in Ukraine and that the Judgement had been issued following “an acutely fact-specific risk assessment about the safety of two children amid a troubling, complex and ever-evolving international conflict involving two sovereign states on the other side of the continent” (para 32-33). Accordingly, as can be seen by both this case and Q v R, it will be, by no means, a foregone conclusion that a return to Ukraine will be refused and it will depend completely on the individual circumstances of that case.

Morven joined Family Law Matters in 2023. She has practised exclusively in the field of family law since qualifying as a solicitor in 2003.

N.B Please note the contents of this Blog do not constitute any form of legal advice and you should always obtain individual advice as to your rights from a family lawyer.